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This paper presents an overview of Indo-Japan cooperation since late 18
th and early 19
th 
century till date.  In the light of the changing paradigm in India-Japan relations over the 
past several years, including the attempt to build a strategic and global partnership 
between them, this paper analyzes the opportunities and challenges for cooperation and 
makes policy recommendations. The paper finds that during the pre-cold era there was a 
strong economic and cultural tie between the two countries, which remained at low level 
during cold war period but it strengthened after the cold war. India-Japan relations have 
over the past several years undergone a paradigmatic shift which has seen the attempt to 
build a strategic and global partnership between them. Current and future economic and 
population dynamics in both the countries mean that India-Japan relations will continue 
to improve not just politically but also in economic terms. 
 
This paper is part of the Japan Chair at ICRIER. The Chair was set up at the Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi with 
funding from Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) to initiate a wide range of research 
activities on Indo-Japan bilateral issues and to provide a fill to the existing research gap 
on Japan in India and help to strengthen ties between the two countries.  One of the 
principal activities of The Japan Chair is to bring together experts and specialists to 
deliberate on future trends in Indo-Japan relations with focus on the likely role of these 
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India’s growing economic strength in recent years has seen it adapting its foreign policy 
to increase its global influence and status and to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 
In the past few years, New Delhi has expanded its strategic vision, most noticeably in 
Asia, and has broadened the definition of its security interests. As a result, India-Japan 
relations have undergone a paradigmatic shift which has seen an attempt to build a 
strategic and global partnership between the two countries.  
 
India and Japan share a special relationship as fellow democracies without hegemonic 
interests and with a similar propensity to seek peaceful resolution of conflicts and greater 
economic engagement in the Asian continent. This paper puts forward the argument that 
while there are certainly problems of communication and distance between the two 
countries, the changing international order – including most notably, the rise of China – 
will see the two countries increasingly thrown together on a variety of issues, some of 
which have been identified in the present work. Current and future economic and 
population dynamics in both the countries mean that India-Japan relations will continue 
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Introduction 
 
In the case of Indo-Japan relations, despite the great complementarity that existed 
between the two countries both politically – since the end of World War II (WWII) – and 
economically, since even earlier, physical distance also meant mental distance as neither 
country figured on each other’s political or economic radars for decades. India’s growing 
economic strength in recent years has seen it adapting its foreign policy to increase its 
global influence and status and to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In the past few 
years, New Delhi has expanded its strategic vision, most noticeably in Asia, and has 
broadened the definition of its security interests. While focusing on developing special 
relationships with the US, Russia, China and European countries, the overall thrust of 
Indian foreign policy has been to seek geopolitical partnerships in multiple directions to 
serve its national interests. In this context, India and Japan share a special relationship as 
fellow democracies without hegemonic interests and with a similar propensity to seek 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and greater economic engagement in the Asian continent.  
 
Although cultural ties between Japan and India go back fourteen centuries when 
Buddhism found its way to Japan in the 7th century AD via China and Korea, the 
relationship has primarily been indirect. Direct contact between the two countries dates 
only to the mid-19th century.  Until the beginning of WWII both countries enjoyed fairly 
close economic ties and the Indian and Japanese elites had considerable sympathy for 
each other’s aspirations. After WWII and India’s independence in 1947, both countries 
opened a new chapter in their relationship as two independent nations and the largest 
democracies in Asia.  
 
Until recently, however, both countries had remained distant concerns for each other. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s the bilateral relationship was relatively inactive, mainly 
because of differing approaches towards international politics and management of the 
domestic economy. During the Cold War era, if India was guilty of dismissing Japan as a 
camp follower of the US, the Japanese in turn perceived India as a chaotic, dysfunctional, 
desperately poor country and not as a potential partner; the persistence of poverty in India 
and the successful drive for prosperity in Japan had changed the bilateral relationship. 
With the end of the Cold War, India began its “Look East” policy in the early 1990s that 
dovetailed with the opening up and liberalization of its economy. However, the Indian 
nuclear tests of 1998 marked a low point in bilateral relations; Japan suspended all 
political exchanges and even economic assistance was frozen for nearly three years. In 
August 2000, however, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori made a five-day visit to 
India that helped propel ties forward. Today, the prolonged economic slump in Japan and 
the re-emergence of India as an economic power are, among other things, once again 
redefining bilateral relations.  
 
In light of the paradigmatic shift in India-Japan relations over the past several years, 
including the attempt to build a mutual strategic and global partnership, this paper 
analyzes the opportunities and challenges for cooperation and makes policy 
recommendations. This paper argues that India-Japan relations will continue to improve 
because the circumstances of the post-Cold War era – including, most notably, the rise of 
China – will reduce the geographical and mental distance between them. Further, we   2
argue that economic ties between India and Japan are likely to strengthen as a result of 
current and future economic and population dynamics in both countries.  
 
Pre-World War II – Rising Japan and Admiring India 
 
In the rise of Japan from the late 19
th century onwards, other Asian nations and peoples 
saw the promise of their own revival, hailing both the speed as well as content of Japan’s 
transformation. During the 1880s and 1890s, the educated class in India particularly the 
leaders of new religious and spiritual movements in Bengal, like PC Mozoomdar and 
Swami Vivekananda, admired the Japanese example and were happy to see the dignity 
and honour of the Japanese character, the enterprise and ceaseless industry of the people, 
their cleanliness, food habits, dress, etiquette and manners. Swami Vivekananda in a 
letter during his visit in 1893 noted that “[t]he Japanese seem now to have fully 
awakened themselves to the necessity of the present times… And they are bent upon 
making everything they want in their own country.”
1 In another letter written on June 
1901, he expressed great hope for better relations saying, “The help that Japan will give 
us will be with great sympathy and respect, whereas that from the West unsympathetic 




The victory of Japan over Czarist Russia in 1904 and its skill in modern warfare 
stimulated nationalist movements in Asia against the colonial powers. As elsewhere in 
Asia, the event produced great excitement in India, and informed opinion saw in it a 
decisive turn in Asia’s relations with Europe. It put new confidence in the Indian 
National Congress of being able to wage and win the struggle against British rule in 
India. In his autobiography, Jawaharlal Nehru recalled the impact of the news of the 
Japanese victory. Writing to his daughter in 1932, Nehru noted that “Japan’s victory was 
seen to be due to her adoption of new industrial methods of the West. These so-called 
Western ideas and methods thus became more popular all over the East.”
3  When the 
Indian freedom struggle entered the swadeshi phase, Japan was seen as a source of new 
equipment and machines to increase the supply of home-made goods and displace 
foreign, mostly British, goods. Simultaneously, the number of Indian students going to 
Japan for education and industrial training began to increase, because Indian thinking was 
influenced by Japan’s assistance in education and industrial development.  
 
These historical instances indicate patterns of what has moved and will continue to 
stimulate the bilateral relationship between India and Japan. Japan’s record of not merely 
adopting Western ideas but also adapting them to the local context and its welcoming of 
Asian students are still major features of the modern Japanese model. Having eschewed 
its imperial ambitions, Japan became a trailblazer in economic development and 
technological innovation, both of which are achievements that developing countries such 
as India seek.  Where India was earlier constrained by colonialism and later self-imposed 
                                                       
1  Speeches and Writings of Swami Vivekananda (Madras: G A Natesan and Co., 1922) p. 753. 
2  The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. VIII (Almora: Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, 1948), pp. 
552-53. 
3  Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter No. 117,” Glimpses of World History, Vol. 2 (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1934), 
pp. 726-7.   3
economic and political restraints, today’s rising India is poised to both gain from and 
contribute to Japan’s new rise in the global order. 
 
Trade links have existed between the two countries for more than a century.  In the late 
19
th and early 20
th centuries, Indian companies based in Japan exported cotton crepe, 
cotton yarn, knitwear, silk pieces, buttons, celluloid bangles, bags, fans, toys, purses, 
matting, umbrellas, willow hampers, matches, wood products, brassware, celluloid-ware, 
glassware, lacquerware, perfumes, soap, paper, camphor, brushes, lanterns etc. from 
Japan and imported raw cotton, rubber, ivory, Arabic gum, sheep skins, tapioca, pepper, 
shellac gum, etc. Appendix 1 shows that several Indian companies and merchants 
connected with the match trade were based in Japan, which highlights the historical ties 
between India and Japan. Oishi (2004), for example, shows that Japanese investment in 
Indian match factories existed as early as 1927. Meanwhile, Japanese foreign investment 
existed in India from the early 1900s.  
 
Historically, Japanese industry depended on the Asian market to sell their goods and for 
the import of raw material.
4 For example, British India was the main market for the 
Japanese matches and the match trade between Japan and India, dated back to early 
1890s. Exports to India from Japan increased greatly during the World War I (WWI), 
filling the vacuum left by the retreat of matches from Sweden and other European 
countries.
 5  
 
India replaced China as Japan’s main market in 1915, and retained that position until 
1925 with cotton goods contributing the most to Japanese exports to India. Table 1 shows 
that between 1927 and 1932 the total cotton goods exported from Japan to India ranged 
from 50 per cent to 64 per cent of total Japanese exports to India.
6  In 1931, India 
produced only 79 per cent of its cotton consumption and the balance was imported from 
Great Britain and Japan, which indicates that Japan had the major share in the huge 
Indian cotton goods market. 
  
Table 1: Japanese Cotton Sales in British India Market (in yen) 1927-1932  
 
  Total Exports to 
lndia 
Cotton yarn  Cotton tissues  Total Cotton 
goods 
1927  167,580,101 20,040,134 86,126,986  106,367,317 
1928  146,006,638  9,181,071 70,185,408 79,366,479 
1929  198,056,969  13,449,318 109,138,997 122,587,315 
1930  129,262,375  6,575,986 61,216,254 67,802,240 
1931  110,367,354  5,592,134 49,866,019 55,458,253 
1932  192,491,854 14,343,099 80,653,540 94,996,639 
 
Source: “Memorandum on Anglo-Indian-Japanese Textile Competition,”  Vol. 2, No. 17, 
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations (New York), 15 September 1933. 
                                                       
4  The Japanese demand for raw cotton, iron ore, mica and manganese ore was mainly met by India. 
5   See Takashi Oishi, “Indo-Japan Cooperative Ventures in Match Manufacturing in India: Muslim 
Merchant Networks in and beyond the Bengal Bay Region 1900-1930,” International Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 1‚ No. 1, January 2004. 
6  Total exports from Japan to India from 1927 to 1932 ranged between 110.4 million yen to 192.5 million 
yen.   4
During the early 1930s, trade in Japanese goods other than cotton increased as a result of 
the Chinese boycott of Japan and the Indian boycott of Great Britain. Of India’s total 
imports, Japan supplied 9.1 per cent in 1930, 10.2 per cent in 1931 and 14.4 per cent in 
1932.
7 In the pre-Cold War era, raw cotton, pig iron, manganese ore, shellac and beans 
were the major export products from India to Japan. 
 
In 1937, Japan’s imports from India and China were 7.05 per cent (US$ 69.5 million) and 
20.63 per cent (US$ 203.4 million), respectively, of the total imports, whereas its exports 
to India and China were 6.07 per cent (US$ 72.5 million) and 25.46 per cent (US$ 304.3 
million), respectively, of the total exports. During the same period, India’s imports from 
Japan and China were 0.03 per cent and 0.6 per cent of the total imports, whereas its 
exports to Japan and China were 9.76 per cent and 1.11 per cent, respectively, of the total 
exports (see Table 2). These trade figures for Japan and India clearly show that there was 
historical economic cooperation between the two countries, but it was slightly lower in 
1940s as compared to 1920s.  
 
Table 2: Intraregional Trade 1937 and 1948 (in US$ million; freight on board 
prices)  
(Share of trade in parentheses) 
 
Japan’s Import and Exports 
   1937* 1948*  1937*  1948* 
Country Imports  Exports 
India   69.5 (7.05)  24.1 (4.15)  72.5 (6.07)  16.8 (6.50) 
China   203.4 (20.63)  11.3 (1.95)  304.3 (25.46)  2.0 (0.77) 
Total   985.7  580.2  1195.3  258.3 
India’s Import and Exports 
Country Imports  Exports 
Japan   72.5 (12.42)  16.8 (1.14)  69.5 (9.76)  24.1 (1.61) 
China   3.5 (0.60)  6.5 (0.44)  7.9 (1.11)  30.3 (2.02) 
Total 583.7  1468.4  712  1499 
 
Adapted from Anthony Y. C. Koo and C. C. Liang, “The Role of Japan in the Intraregional Trade 
of the Far East,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 35, No. 1. February 1953, pp. 31-
40.  
* This statistical table is based on C. C. Liang, “Intraregional Trade of Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East Countries (ECAFE),” International Monetary Fund (mimeographed 
memorandum 1948) and the Intraregional Trade of the Far East in 1949 as compared with 1937 
and 1948, International Monetary Fund (mimeographed memorandum, 1951). 
                                                       
7  “Memorandum on Anglo-Indian-Japanese Textile Competition,”  Vol. 2, No. 17, American Council, 
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York), 15 September 1933,   5
After 1937, there was a turnaround in the trade between Japan and India.  In 1939, India 
ranked third both as a market for Japanese goods and as a source of imports. In 1939, 
India’s share of Japanese imports was 6.3 per cent while its   share of Japanese exports 
was 5.9 per cent (see Table 3). During the same year, India’s share of Japanese cotton 
imports was larger than any other country; by volume it was 33.6 per cent and by value it 
was 26.2 per cent of total Japanese cotton imports. That year, India supplied 90 per cent 
of Japan’s imports of mica and in 1936 India was the single largest supplier of pig iron.
8 
In 1939, India imported cotton yarn worth ¥29 million of the total Japanese exports of 
cotton yarn worth ¥71 million, rayon worth ¥14 million of the total Japanese exports of 
rayon worth ¥29 million, and rayon goods worth ¥20 million of total exports of ¥137 
million (Table 4). 
 
Table 3: Japan’s External Trade in 1939 
 
  Total (world)  India’s Share  India’s Rank 
Imports  ¥ 2905 million  6.3 %  3
rd 
Exports  ¥ 3564 million  5.9%  3
rd 
 
Source: Adapted from Irving S. Friedman, “India and Japan Exchange Key Products,” Far 
Eastern Survey, Vol. 9, No. 18., 28 August, 1940, pp. 215-216. 
 
Table 4: Japanese Cotton Sales in British India Market in 1939 
 
  Value of exports (in 
million yen) 






Exports to India  Total exports to 
world 
Cotton tissue  ¥73  ¥ 405  46 million sq. yds.  2,445 million sq. 
yds 
Cotton yarn  ¥29  ¥ 71  215,000 piculs  630,000 piculs 
Rayon yarn  ¥14  ¥ 29  147,000 piculs  278,000 piculs 
Rayon piece 
goods 
¥20  ¥ 137  50 million sq. yds  310 million sq. 
yds 
 
Source: Adapted from Irving S. Friedman, “India and Japan Exchange Key Products,” Far 
Eastern Survey, Vol. 9, No. 18., 28 August, 1940, pp. 215-216. 
 
In 1948, there was a drop in regional trade due to WWII, so any inferences would be 
biased.  Despite the shattered Japanese economy, Japan continued its trade links with 
India. In the pre-Cold War era, India was a major trading partner of Japan, which 
depended on India not only as an important source of raw material but also as the leading 
                                                       
8  Irving S. Friedman, “India and Japan Exchange Key Products,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 9, No. 18., 28 
August, 1940, pp. 215-216.   6
market for Japanese products. The pre-Cold War era thus saw great economic 
cooperation between India and Japan, which was later interrupted by the Cold War. 
 
Independent India and Japan 
 
Following WWII, during which Indian troops under the British Empire fought Japanese 
troops and Indians under the Indian National Army fought the British with Japanese 
support, India played a limited role in the Allied Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. 
Justice Radha Binod Pal was the lone dissenting voice on the war crimes tribunal set up 
to try Japanese war criminals, including Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. Once India became 
independent, it expressed support for Japanese interests; its delegation at the Far Eastern 
Commission, for example, was sympathetic to Japanese concerns about rebuilding their 
nation and to encouraging Japanese industry and finance. In 1949, the Indian delegation 
stopped pressing the question in the Commission regarding its share of reparations from 
Japan and proposed halting the reparations altogether, noting that the burden of making 
such payments told heavily on the living standards of the Japanese people.
9 India’s 
interest in Japan’s rapid economic recovery also found expression in other international 
forums. Further, India welcomed the relaxation of controls on Japan because of the flow 
of Japanese technical expertise to the rest of Asia.  
 
Although 52 nations assembled to sign a peace treaty with Japan at San Francisco in 
September 1951, India did not participate because of its belief that the Japanese Peace 
settlement was part of the Cold War and the principal parties to it were more interested in 
enlisting support for their respective positions than to bringing peace to Asia. India 
applied two crucial tests to determine whether it was going to participate in the Japanese 
Peace treaty. First, did the treaty accord Japan a place of honour, equality and 
contentment in the family of nations? Second, did the treaty contribute to amity and 
friendship in the Far East? On both counts the treaty was found to fall short of India’s 
expectations and, therefore, it chose not to participate. Instead, India decided that 
immediately after Japan regained its independent status India would make a declaration 
terminating the state of war between the two countries and later negotiate a simple, 
bilateral treaty with Japan.
10 
 
The Japanese public responded favourably to India’s stand, particularly its opposition to 
linking the peace treaty with a bilateral security arrangement. Given the high esteem in 
which India, and particularly Nehru, was held by most Japanese in those years, there was 
appreciation that India had raised its voice and expressed dissatisfaction with the terms of 
the treaty in so far as they concerned the prospects for peace in Asia. Much of this 
warmth and high esteem was echoed in more recent times when Japanese Prime 
Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe used them in combination with the new 
realities of the international order to make a case for improved Indo-Japan ties. 
 
                                                       
9   See P. A. Narasimha Murthy, India and Japan: Dimensions of Their Relations (New Delhi: ABC 
Publishing House, 1986). 
10  Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 15, pt. 2, 27 August 1951, col. 1360.    7
The Cold War and India-Japan Relations 
 
In the period between World War II and the end of the Cold War, the positive popular 
perceptions of each other were not sufficient to prevent India and Japan joining the post-
WWII community of nations with diametrically opposing political orientations. Non-
alignment, peaceful coexistence and recognition of China’s rightful place in the world 
shaped India’s outlook, whereas Japan based its position on alignment, balance of power 
and the containment of China. These differences influenced how each nation viewed the 
other and conditioned their responses to critical world problems. In consequence, they 
moved slowly and cautiously with respect to each other in political and security terms; 
their relations remained limited to economic, commercial and cultural matters where 
relations progressed extremely slowly. 
 
Indo-Japanese political connections remained weak despite the exchange of ambassadors, 
mutual visits by goodwill groups and parliamentary delegations, and the conclusion of 
trade and other accords. The highlights of the political exchange were the warm 
receptions accorded to Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke during his visit to India 
in May 1957 and to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during his visit to Japan 
later in the year. Following these visits, India received its first Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) in 1958. 
 
Soon, however, the exchange of high-level visits descended to mere formality without 
impacting the content of the bilateral relationship as Japan made rapid economic progress 
and the harsh realities of the Cold War intervened. The latter was exemplified by the 
mutual lack of trust, especially where relations with the superpowers were concerned and 
conflicting perceptions of how the international order should be shaped. On specific 
international questions such as the Sino-Indian border conflict and the India-Pakistan 
wars, Japan showed no overt interest either in lending support to India or in opposing it.  
The Japanese consciously treated India and Pakistan evenhandedly, participating in their 
economic development programmes without getting drawn into their disputes. A general 
tilt towards its ‘ally’s ally’ was an unstated assumption behind that policy. During the 
India-Pakistan conflict, Japan’s diplomatic moves in the UN were not necessarily hostile 
to India, but its action on the aid front could be interpreted thus. Soon after the US 
suspended its aid to India, Japan also enforced an embargo on flow of credits and all 
fresh loans. 
 
Economic Relationship during the Cold War 
 
Despite the initial enthusiasm and high hopes of the 1950s, the Indo-Japan relationship 
failed to take off politically and the relationship was essentially dormant from the 1960s 
to the 1980s. Nevertheless, during the Cold War period Japan became the largest bilateral 
donor to India. Thus, the relationship was primarily sustained by Japanese ODA, with 
minor additional support provided by trade. Japan’s position as India’s largest aid donor 
continues to the present.  
 
   8
Table 5: Yen Loans offered to India (from September 1973) 
 





st  yen loan  Feb.   '58  50.00 
2
nd  yen loan  Aug.  '6I  80.00 
2
nd  yen loan (additional)  May  '63  15.00 
3
rd  yen loan  Oct.  '63  65.00 
4
th  yen loan  Sep.  '64  60.00 
5
th  yen loan  Jul.  '65  60.00 
6
th  yen loan (in goods)  Dec.  '66  42.50 
1966 debt reschedule  Dec.  '66  2.50 
Emergency food aid  Jul.  '67  7.00 
1967 debt reschedule  Aug.  '67  6.10 
7
th  yen loan (in goods)  Sep.  '67  38.90 
1968 debt reschedule  Aug.  '68  16.83 
8
th  yen loan (in goods)  Feb.   '69  28.17 
1969 debt reschedule  Jul.  '69  19.56 
9
th  yen loan (in goods)  Feb.  '70  25.44 
Yen loan for port expansion project (project aid) Mar. '70  7.00 
1970 debt reschedule  Jul.  '70  25.41 
10
th  yen loan (in goods)  Apr.  '71  25.39 
Yen loan for seabed oil exploration  (project aid) Apr.  '71  15.40 
I 971 debt reschedule  Jul.  '71  20.60 
11
th  yen loan & special loans  Feb.  '72  70.96 
Total     681.76 
 
Adapted from Zilur R Khan, “Japanese Relations with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975-1976, pp. 541-57. Source: M I T I (Ministry of International 
Trade & Industries, Japan). 
 
During the Cold War, there was a certain degree of trade cooperation due to rising 
demand from changes in the economic structure of both countries. However, there was a 
change in the major export and import items from the early 1900s. The major traded 
commodities changed from cotton-related products in the early 1900s to heavy machinery 
in the 1970s. Table 6 shows that in 1970-72 iron ore became the major item that Japan 
imported from India and other imports include hemp fabrics, textile products, and 
precious and semi-precious stones.  During the same period heavy industrial products 
were the major export commodities from Japan besides metal and metal products like 
iron and steel and steel plates.  
   9
Table 6: Japanese Export-Import to India (Values in units of US$ 1,000) 
 
Items 1970  1971  1972 
Japanese Imports from India 
Iron ore  198,922.00  205,240.00  218,813.00 
Hemp fabrics  3,510.00       4,054.00  7,517.00 
Textile products  5,746.00        6,232.00      11,333.00  
Precious and semi-precious stones  6,002.00        9,981.00      17,102.00  
Japanese Exports to India 
Heavy industrial products  91,815.00    186,208.00    217,380.00  
Metals and metal products  40,043.00      99,690.00    120,477.00  
Iron and Steel  32,356.00      85,090.00      99,952.00  
Steel plates  5,552.00      27,612.00      36,438.00  
 
Adapted from Zilur R Khan, “Japanese Relations with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975-1976, pp 541-57. Source: White Papers on International 
Trade Japan, J E T K O (Japan External Trade Organization), 1972 and 1973. 
 
As the Cold War wound down, Indo-Japanese relations stepped up.  The 1980s marked 
the beginning of a new phase in Indo-Japan relations. One factor in bringing about a new 
approach was the first major joint venture between India and Japan – the Maruti-Suzuki 
plant to manufacture cars in India. The visit of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to 
India in 1984 – the first visit by a Japanese PM in 23 years – followed by the visits of 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Japan in 1985, 1987 and 1988 established a high-level 
political dialogue. The Science and Technology Agreement signed during Rajiv Gandhi’s 
visit in November 1985 increased the frequency of exchanges in this area. 
 
The stagnation in the relationship was finally broken during the early 1990s when India 
undertook major economic reforms by liberalizing the country’s economy, and adopted 
an open-door policy that led to a gradual acceleration of bilateral business relationships. 
Bilateral trade and Japanese investment in India began to increase, as India began to be 
seen favourably as a long-term prospect in Japanese business planning. In 1996 direct 
investment from Japan aggregated to nearly ¥.45 billion and Japan was the second largest 
destination for India’s exports (see Appendices V and X). However, from the Japanese 
perspective these figures are hardly flattering. Of the total Japanese global trade, India 
has a minuscule share and ranks 20
th among Japan’s trade partners, well below the US, 
China, the European Union, and East and Southeast Asian countries (see Appendices IV, 
V, VII and VIII). The case is similar with regard to Japanese FDI in India. 
   10
End of the Cold-War and Re-emerging India-Japan Economic Cooperation 
 
Immediately after the Cold War, India suffered from a balance of payments crisis in 1991, 
which provided an opportunity for Japan to extend cooperation.
11 India’s adoption of the 
“Look East” policy and the economic liberalization process in 1991 gave a further 
impetus to the Indo-Japanese relationship. During 1997, the Government of Japan 
pledged about Rs.3923 crore to support 10 major projects in India, in areas like power 
generation and transmission, development of ports, irrigation, afforestation, sericulture, 
and development of small-scale industries. As India began growing rapidly from the early 
1990s, its weight in Asia also began to grow (see Table 7 and Appendix II). 
 
Table 7: GDP and Global Rank in 2006 (in million US$) 
 
Rank Country  GDP  Rank Country  PPP  GDP 
2  Japan   4,340,133  2  China   10,048,026 b 
4  China   2,668,071  3  India     4,247,361 c 
12  India   906,268  4  Japan   4,131,195 
 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, 1 July 2007; Note available. PPP 
is purchasing power parity; an international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as 




In the post-Cold War era (since the 1990s), Japanese ODA to India increased 
substantially. Japan provided approximately ¥184.89 billion in loans to India in FY2006. 
The commitment was an increase of 18.9 per cent over the previous year, and was the 
highest ever amount of yen loans to India. Since 2003 India has been the largest recipient 
of Japanese ODA The cumulative amount of Japan’s loans to India adds up to 
approximately ¥2,817 billion. Until 2006, the cumulative amount of grant aid provided 
by Japan to India amounted to ¥86.69 billion and loan assistance amounted to ¥2817.166 
billion. The deliberate intention to enhance the economic relationship over the last few 
years is highlighted by the Japanese assistance in building the Delhi-Mumbai industrial 
corridor among other major projects. 
 
The focus areas of Japan’s ODA to India have been as follows: development of physical 
infrastructure, mainly in the areas of power and transportation; poverty reduction through 
agricultural and rural development; environmental protection, through afforestation and 
improvement of water quality; and assisting improvements in health and medical care. 
Japan’s Country Assistance Program for India was formulated in May 2006 with the 
following priority areas: i) promotion of economic growth (power and transportation, 
etc.),  ii) improvement in poverty issues (health and sanitation, local development, 
disaster prevention, development of tourism, etc.), iii) improvement in environmental 
                                                       
11  Japan was foremost in coming to India’s assistance with quick-disbursing bilateral aid as well as through 
the ADB, World Bank and IMF.   11
issues (water supply and sewerage systems, forestry, renewable energy and energy 
saving, and urban environment), and iv) expansion of human resource development and 
people-to-people exchange. 
 
The Japan-India Joint Statement issued in April 2005 stated the resumption of the Japan 
Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) programme that had remained suspended since 
1979 due to policy changes by the Government of India in 1978. In April 2006, after a 
gap of 30 years, a JOCV group was sent to India to teach the Japanese language.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Japan ranks only fifth in terms of cumulative FDI equity inflow to India. From April 
2000 to August 2007, Mauritius, the US, the UK and the Netherlands ranked higher than 
Japan in terms of cumulative inflow. During this period, the cumulative inflow of FDI 
equity from Mauritius stood at 44.72 per cent, from the US at 9.90 per cent, the UK, 8.63 
per cent, the Netherlands at 5.65 per cent and from Japan at 4.63 per cent. Japanese FDI 
to India started falling after 1998 mainly as a result of India’s nuclear tests that year and 
remained very low from 2000 to 2004. After 2004, however, Japanese FDI inflow to 
India started increasing. By totaling only the 27 FDI projects reported in the Japanese 
media, Japan’s FDI to India amounts to around US$ 5.5 billion over 5 years from 2006 to 
2010. The net value of the Japanese “India portfolio investment funds” as of March 2007 
was US$ 8.2 billion, increasing from US$ 4.7 billion at the end of November 2005 (see 




Cumulative figures from August 1991 to August 2007 show that Japan ranks third in 
terms of technology transfers to India. Between August 1991 and August 2007, Japan 
contributed 10.92 per cent (861 instances) of the total technological transfer to India 
(Table 8). This indicates that Japan has played an important role in the economic 
development of India but still remains far behind the US. Especially since 2004, Japan 
has taken a conscious decision to promote economic cooperation with India and Japanese 
FDI thus increased during 2004-2006. Cooperation between the India and Japanese auto 
sectors, for example, has been a success story of Indo-Japanese cooperation. However, 
there is potential for greater cooperation between India and Japan in the area of 
developing high technology. Most of this cooperation will naturally involve dual-use 
technology. But India's nuclear program may continue to be a source of tension between 
the two countries. Several Indian companies continue to remain under Japanese sanctions 
and are denied technology transfers on the grounds that India is a non-signatory to the 
NPT.
13 The answer to the question of whether or not the two countries will transcend this 
                                                       
12  Embassy of Japan in India: Japan India Relation-Japan’s Active Engagement in Business Cooperation 
with India. 
13  Often such discrimination has continued even after the Indian companies were struck off the entities list 
by the Japanese government. See “Japan-India Partnership in the Era of Asian Regional Integration”, 
Report of Seminar held at the India International Centre on 16 November 2007, Article No. 2429, 28 
November 2007, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 
http://ipcs.org/newIpcsSeminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2445.   12
obvious gap in views and interests lies again in the domestic Japanese context and the 
changing international environment, including the fate of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. 
 
Table 8: Country-Wise Technology Transfer Approvals (August 1991 to August 
2007) 
 
Rank  Country  No. of Technical 
Collaborations approved 
Percentage of  total 
tech. approvals 
 1.     USA   1,750  22.19 
 2.     Germany    1,103  13.99 
 3.     Japan    861  10.92 
 4.     U.K.    856  10.85 
 5.     Italy    484  6.14 
 6.     Other Countries    2,832  35.91 
Total of all countries  7,886  100.00 
 
Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. 
 
The Trade Relationship  
 
From 1989 to 1997, Japan moved between the 2
nd and 3
rd positions in terms of India’s 
export destination but it fell to the 6
th position in 1998, and 10
th in 2005 before rising 
again to the 8
th position in 2006 (Appendix IV). This change is due to the shift in 
manufacturing bases from Japan to China and the ASEAN countries. The US occupied 
the top position as a supplier of goods to India from 1989 to 2003 and second position 
since 2003. China, which ranked 20
th in 1993 among countries from where India was 
importing, has seen its exports increase rapidly and ranked 4
th in 2002, 3
rd in 2003 and 
finally took the top position in 2004. Japan was 4
th in terms of India’s imports from 1989 
to 1991 but has steadily fallen since to 7
th in 2001, 8
th in 2002 and 2003, 10
th in 2004 and 
2005 and 11
th in 2006 (see Appendix V). This is due to the same reason outlined above.  
 
Graph 1 shows that during 1989-2006 the share of India’s exports to Japan declined 
rapidly while that to China increased. In 1989, the share of India’s exports to Japan was 
13.49 per cent but it declined steadily to just 2.43 per cent in 2005, rebounding slightly to 
3.05 per cent in 2006. In that year, the share of India’s exports to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC, not including Hong Kong) was 0.9 per cent and in 2000 it was 1.78 per 
cent, but from 2001 it increased from 3.39 per cent to 7.75 per cent in 2006. In terms of 
imports, the pattern is similar.  The share of India’s imports from Japan was 7.74 per cent 
in 1989 but it declined over the years, touching 2.58 per cent in 2005 before rising to 2.67 
per cent in 2006. In contrast, the share of India’s imports from the Chinese Mainland was 
0.20 per cent in 1989 and it increased steadily, reaching 8.67 per cent in 2006 (see 
Appendix VI). 
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Graph 1 :Share of India’s exports and imports by country (percentage) 
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Japan’s Exports & Imports 
 
India has never been among Japan’s top 20 export destinations during the period from 
1989 to 2006 (see Appendix VII).  Instead, the US that was the top export destination of 
Japan and South Korea fluctuated between the 2
nd and 3
rd positions. The PRC was the 7
th 
top export destination of Japan in 1989, 11
th in 1990, 5
th in 1993 and 1995, 4
th from 1996 
to 1997, and has been 2
nd since 2001.  
 
India has also never been among the top 20 suppliers to Japan. In 1989, India ranked 23
rd, 
21
st in 1993 and 1994, 28
th in 2004, 27
th in 2005, and 26
th in 2006. The US was again the 
top exporter to Japan from 1989 to 2001, giving way to China since 2001, which had 
been ranked 2
nd from 1991 to 2001 (see Appendix VIII). This is a clear indication that 
Japan, US, China are stronger trading partners than India.  
  
Graph 2 shows that the share of Japan’s exports to India was always below one per cent 
and, in fact, declined marginally between 1989 and 2006. On the other hand, the share of 
Japan’s exports to the Chinese Mainland was 3.09 per cent in 1989, but increased steadily 
and reached 9.59 per cent in 2002, 12.18 per cent in 2003, 13.06 per cent in 2004, 13.45 
per cent in 2005 and 14.35 per cent in 2006. The share of Japan’s imports from India was 
0.94 per cent in 1989, but it steadily decreased to 0.71 per cent in 2006. In contrast, the 
share of Japan’s imports from China was 5.29 per cent in 1989 and it increased steadily 
to 20.47 per cent (see Appendix IX). Taken together, Graphs 1 and 2 indicate that Indo-
Japanese trade relations appear to be weakening, while Indo-China trade relations are 
strengthening. 
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Graph 2: Share of Japan’s exports and imports by country (percentage) 
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Table 9 shows the major goods traded between India and Japan.  There does not appear to 
have been much change in the composition of trade between India and Japan from 1970 
to 2006. In 2006 the major items exported from India include mineral fuels, mineral oil, 
gems and jewelry, ores, slag and ash, while the major imports include machinery, 
electrical machinery, and iron and steel. Indo-Japanese business cooperation rapidly fell 
after India’s nuclear test in 1998 but has picked up since. 
 
Table 9: Composition of India’s Trade with Japan in 2006 
 
Major Exports  Percentage Share  Major Imports  Percentage Share
Mineral fuels and Oils  16.98  Machinery  31.97 
Gems and Jewelry  15.32  Electrical 
Machinery  12.83 
Ores, Slag and Ash  12.35  Iron and Steel  8.81 
 
In order to strengthen trade cooperation with Japan, India needs to do more. Both 
governments have made serious efforts to improve economic cooperation and given the 
changes in the trade structures, population dynamics and economic development in both 
countries, there are enormous opportunities for cooperation. India and Japan are natural 
economic partners and are beginning to renew their strong economic relationship of the 
pre-WWII years. This time there are a larger number of joint ventures and a greater 
likelihood that the politics of the relationship will not adversely affect economic aspects. 
In fact, the increasing political comfort levels will lead to greater economic integration 
between the two countries. Examples include the strong Japanese support for the Indian   15
candidature in the East Asian Summit and for an increased ASEAN+6 economic 
grouping. 
 
The Rise of Indo-Japan Ties Post-1998 
 
Politically and strategically speaking, Japan, like China, only sat up and took serious note 
of India when the latter decided to reassert its nuclear capabilities in 1998. However, that 
alone would not have held their attention had not India’s economic growth started 
producing results and were it not for the fact that the Americans started courting New 
Delhi as well. While Yoshiro Mori and Atal Behari Vajpayee, set the ball rolling for 
Indo-Japanese relations in 2000 with the call for “global partnership,”
14 Junichiro 
Koizumi and Manmohan Singh followed up with the “eight-fold initiative” in 2005.
15 
During the latter’s visit to Tokyo during the tenure of Shinzo Abe, the two Prime 
Ministers decided to make the partnership “strategic” as well.
16 This latter dimension saw 
expression in the Quadrilateral Initiative (QI) involving the US, Japan, Australia and 
India and the Malabar Exercises involving the navies of these countries in addition to that 
of Singapore, that took place in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. Earlier, in April 
the same year, the US, Japan and India had conducted joint naval exercises in the South 
China Sea. 
 
Degrees of Separation 
 
It may perhaps be said without much exaggeration that India-Japan ties have not quite 
followed an obvious or a natural course of growth as would have been expected between 
two large, democratic nations both situated in Asia and sharing several common strategic 
interests. It is only in the post-Cold War period and particularly after the Indian nuclear 
tests of 1998 that the two countries have begun to look at each other seriously in political 
and strategic terms or begun an engagement along these lines. In addition to the changed 
global strategic and security environment, there are several factors that have and will 
have an impact on the relations between the two countries.  These factors, ranging from 
their common democratic traditions to cultural factors, will be examined here. 
 
Brahma Chellaney makes the point that democratic traditions make that India and Japan 
are natural allies.
17  But is this really the case? Like the oft-repeated statement that 
“democracies do not go to war,” there certainly is some truth to Chellaney’s point. 
However, India and Japan are both young democracies and geographical distance has 
added to the various degrees of separation that exist between the two countries in 
historical, cultural, and linguistic spheres. India and Japan are no more natural allies than 
are India and China, if they do not learn to interact more at the people-to-people level. 
                                                       
14   See “Japan-India Summit Meeting (Summary),” 23 August 2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Government of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india_s.html.  
15 See “Joint Statement, India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India-Japan 
Global Partnership,” 29 April 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
http://meaindia.nic.in/. 
16  See “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” 15 December 2006, 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://meaindia.nic.in/. 
17 Brahma Chellaney, “Japan, India: natural allies,” The Japan Times, 16 August 2007.   16
Hitherto, interaction between the two countries has largely remained at the inter-
governmental level or been exoticized. Economic interaction is usually the first concrete 
step towards regular and sustainable bilateral relations but in the India-Japan case the fact 
that economic dealings over more than two decades, have not really been translated into 
any substantial political capital shows that more needs to be done to raise the relationship 
to a higher level. Former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe attempted to do just that 
during his brief tenure. 
 
The personality and vision of leaders matter a great deal in the pursuit and 
accomplishment of policy goals. Until Abe came along no Japanese leader had invested 
so deeply in the relationship with India, with perhaps the exception of his grandfather, 
Nobusuke Kishi, who in 1957 was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit India. Abe 
wrote in his book, “Toward a Beautiful Country,” that Japanese national interests would 
be advanced “by strengthening our ties with India." He went so far as to speculate that it 
would “not be a surprise if in another decade, Japan-India relations overtake Japan-U.S. 
and Japan-China ties.”
18 Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a resounding 
defeat in elections to the Upper House of the Japanese Diet in September 2007 that soon 
forced him to step down. With the ascension of Yasuo Fukuda, one of the older school of 
Japanese politicians, it seems as if it might safely be said that such radical ideas as Abe’s 
are likely to remain in cold storage for a while, yet.  
 
Part of the reason has to do with the fact in India-Japan ties have not really led to a 
regular flow of people between the two sides. Japanese came to India either as 
businessmen or tourists, but did not seem to engage with the country or its people in any 
substantial way, the way Americans or Europeans have done. Japan and the Japanese 
continued to be reluctant to open up to the world in the post-World War II years, except 
economically – even as the country is becoming Westernized and increasingly affected 
by global events; this indicates that  Japan has not yet made the transition from its corner 
in East Asia to the global stage. Today, the tapering off of Japanese economic growth, 
and strategic factors in the neighbourhood, chiefly, the rise of China, have combined to 
push Japan towards ‘normalizing’ its status in the world and to move beyond depending 
on the US security umbrella to achieve its political goals. In other words, it was only 
when Japan was challenged economically and politically and found its ally the US, 
increasingly reluctant to put up with the burden of guaranteeing Japan’s security that 
Tokyo began its outward push towards ‘normalization.’ In such a situation, it was 
obvious that India – itself in the midst of a wide-ranging economic transformation and 
international assertion – would be seen as a “natural partner.”  
 
Abe’s push towards greater engagement with India was part of this process, but the fact 
the Fukuda did not mention India once in his opening speech as Prime Minister in the 
Japanese Diet or in his first press conference in his new position,
19 can definitely be 
                                                       
18 Quoted in Brahma Chellaney, “Japan, India: natural allies,” The Japan Times, 16 August 2007. 
19 Yasuo Fukuda, “Statement by the Prime Minister,” 26 September 2007, Speeches and Statements by 
Prime Minister, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hukudaspeech/2007/09/26danwa_e.html and 
“Press Conference by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, 25 September 2007, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hukudaspeech/2007/09/25press_e.html.  Although Abe, too never   17
considered a setback and an indication of where India truly stands once exceptional 
factors, such as Abe are removed from the scene. Another example of where things seem 
to be cooling off is the QI. Political leadership and personalities can push through ideas 
and create breakthroughs where matters had until now floundered for lack of interest or 
vision, but that is still no substitute for durable processes and clear and sustainable goals 
to help carry forward activities thus initiated. And in the case of the QI, it was obvious 
from the beginning that it was largely pushed out of the personal interest of a few leaders 
involved – chiefly, US President George W Bush, Abe and then Australian Prime 
Minister, John Howard – and did not take adequate steps to deny or ameliorate the anti-
China overtones that immediately came into view. As a result, as soon as Abe and 
Howard exited in 2007, their successors were quick to reiterate that their respective 
countries viewed the relationship with China as extremely important and were not going 
to be drawn into anything that hinted otherwise. Fukuda might have made his first official 
visit as Prime Minister to the US (unlike Abe who made his first visits to China and 
South Korea) but ended 2007 with a very successful visit to China. Meanwhile, Kevin 
Rudd, the new Australian Prime Minister, is an ex-diplomat and a fluent Mandarin 
speaker. 
 
The “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
20   – Joint Action in Afghanistan and 
Myanmar 
 
In contrast with India’s outlook and role in the Cold War era, Japan remained inward-
looking and its international profile remained somewhat subdued. Even where Asia and 
Asian problems were concerned, Japan moved cautiously and its vision remained 
restricted to its immediate neighbourhood. In the United Nations, it sympathized with the 
Afro-Asian group but never fully identified itself with the group’s aspirations and 
policies.  
 
Politically, India can help Japan expand its “diplomatic horizons.” Japan’s “value 
oriented diplomacy”
21 is intended to counter the unease in the rest of East Asia over 
                                                                                                                                                               
mentioned India in his first speech to the Diet his statement that he would “shift to proactive diplomacy 
that will actively contribute to stalwart solidarity in Asia,” indicates that that India was part of his 
scheme of things. See “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” 26 September 2006, Speeches and 
Statements by Prime Minister, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/index_e.html. Similarly, in his statement to the cabinet on the 
“basic policies” to be followed, he declared, “We will provide ODA strategically and make efforts to 
ensure the stable provision of energy resources.” This was clearly a continuation of the policy of the 
Koizumi period in which India replaced China as the largest recipient of Japanese ODA. See Shinzo 
Abe, “Basic Policies,” 26 September 2006, Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister, Prime Minister 
of Japan and His Cabinet, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/09/26houshin_e.html. 
However, in his first press conference, Abe specifically mentioned India as one of the countries that he 
wanted Japan to “strengthen” relations with. See “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” 26 
September 2006, Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/09/26press_e.html.  
20  This is an expression used by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Aso. See Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” Speech at the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs Seminar, 30 November 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.    18
Japan’s normalization, and parallels in some respects, the way in which the Chinese came 
up with their theory of “peaceful rise,” later modified to “peaceful development,” to 
counter the ‘China threat’ theory. India has for long espoused its democratic values in 
motley groups such as the NAM and the Commonwealth to little effect. Today, it is in a 
position to work in concert with Japan and the US to ensure that those values hold as 
much meaning outside its borders as they do within them. India and Japan as part of their 
declared aim of expanding the “arc of freedom and prosperity” can together play 
important roles in both Afghanistan and Myanmar, for example.  
 
India has huge strategic stakes in both countries and is involved in a balancing game 
against Pakistan and China respectively. Japan has committed considerable sums for 
reconstruction in Afghanistan as part of the US campaign against terror. In Myanmar, 
however, it has followed a policy more independent of the US and has not imposed 
sanctions against the junta preferring instead a policy of constructive engagement, 
including providing ODA. As in the case of India, there is here, no doubt, an element of 
countering China.   
 
Both India and Japan can extend their respective engagements in Afghanistan and 
Myanmar further by putting in place a joint policy in place rather than continuing to 
operate on their own. However, nether country must look at the other merely as an 
accomplice in military or political terms to help it maneuver better against its perceived 
adversaries. Apart from being an unsustainable strategy, this does not win either country 
any friends in Afghanistan or Myanmar. An India-Japan partnership in these countries 
faces two potential risks – one arises from the association with the US and another arises 
from a perceived disassociation from China. India and Japan cannot afford to be 
perceived as doing the US’s job by proxy. Indian and Japanese reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan must be aimed primarily at winning the hearts and minds of the people 
before any other strategy can fall into place. The efforts must be similar in Myanmar, 
where there is the additional challenge of not being seen as ganging up against China.  
 
It is, however, no use denying the legitimate security and ideological concerns that 
Pakistan poses for India in Afghanistan and that China poses for both India and Japan in 
Myanmar. Neither India nor Japan need be reticent about expressing faith in their 
democratic systems or timid about seeking to expand democratic freedoms to 
Afghanistan or Myanmar, even if this might be perceived as anti-Pakistan or anti-China. 
Where they can do it differently is to do it with greater subtlety and patience than the US 
has. Sanctions are not the way forward in Myanmar and a refusal to talk to all sections of 
Afghan society including the Taliban will not bring peace to Afghanistan. India has the 
political experience and Japan the economic muscle, that can be combined to advance an 
alternative framework for the resolution of conflicts and tensions in these countries. In 
the process, they give the countries involved additional choices and opportunities.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
21  See Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” Speech at the 
Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, 30 November 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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Ultimately, the idea of the “arc” provides an alternative vision for areas as different as 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia and now, increasingly Africa, where Chinese influence has 
been on the ascendant and is likely to clash with a renewed American interest in the 
continent. 
 
The Security Relationship 
 
In recent years, Japan has been attempting to ‘normalize’ itself by playing a more active 
role in international affairs, including military deployment overseas, even if it is in non-
combat roles. This process has caused concern not only domestically but also among 
Japan’s immediate neighbours that bore the brunt of Japanese expansionism and 
colonialism and which was brought to an end only by its defeat in WWII. That said, 
‘normalization’ is likely to move forward incrementally at least, if not rapidly, owing to a 
number of factors.  
 
First, there are voices in the US calling for Japan to take up a greater share of the 
responsibilities under their bilateral security treaty, especially when the former is engaged 
in two separate theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq.
22  Second, the rise of China, the 
concomitant rise in Chinese military spending and the lack of transparency on military 
issues have stoked Japanese fears about their own level of preparedness and ability to 
cope with the challenge. Third, Japan has been aware for some time – at least since the 
first Gulf War in 1991 – that economic might alone is insufficient to gain it respect in the 
world community. Fourth, the combination of the slowdown of the Japanese economy 
and the shifting of the world economic growth momentum to other countries in Asia 
which in turn led to fall of the Japanese “salaryman,” has led Japanese Prime Ministers 
like Koizumi and Abe to emphasize robust military capability and the willingness to 
deploy that capability as a means of rejuvenating both the Japanese economy and the 
Japanese psyche. In this sense, there is a very obvious move to revive and make more 
visible a sense of Japanese nationalism. 
 
All these factors have meant that Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution of Japan 
has come under pressure. While the standard interpretation is that the Article disallows 
any kind of military buildup by Japan, this has been challenged almost from its inception 
with the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1952, and the use of 
Japanese bases by US forces during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. While debate 
over Article 9 has simmered in post WWII Japan, this was largely restricted to the 
political and policymaking elites. However, in recent years, and particularly during and 
after Koizumi’s tenure, the debate has intensified and increasingly become part of 
mainstream discourse. In fact, Japan has since the end of the Cold War, increasingly 
begun to push the limits by first deploying Japanese troops in peacekeeping operations 
under the UN mandate beginning with Cambodia in 1992 to now deploying them in non-
                                                       
22  This reluctance is not new. Former US President, Richard Nixon, argued that when the US assumed 
responsibility for the defence of Japan, the US economy comprised some 50 per cent of the world’s total 
economy, but this fell to below 30 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a prod to Japanese 
militarization.   20
combat roles in a war zone like Iraq and providing logistics support such as refueling for 
US-led coalition ships in the Indian Ocean. 
 
In this context, it is becoming increasingly likely that constitutional amendment or not, 
Japanese forces will begin to play a more active role both in East Asia and in the 
extended neighbourhood. Given that Japan too is heavily dependent on energy supplies 
from the Middle East, and that the safety of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) are a 
vital security interest, it may perhaps be expected that Japan will find additional grounds 
for engaging India. Indeed, maritime cooperation is one of the most promising areas for 
Indo-Japan defence cooperation.  
 
It is important however, to stress that India and Japan should as mature nations, find their 
own reasons for – to use another term that is much in vogue in India’s neighbourhood – 
an “all-weather” partnership, instead of relying on the US to egg them on or on China to 
scare them into one. India will also need to keep track of the changes in Japanese policy, 
including the domestic debate over Article 9, to enable a more sustainable and long-term 
policy of defence cooperation with Japan. 
  
While Japan is still most closely tied in to the US for its security needs, the QI offered a 
hint of the promise of expanded security ties between India and Japan as well. While the 
Initiative has been put on the backburner, it is still a project that holds promise. Japan, 
Australia and the US held their first ministerial-level trilateral strategic talks in late 2005 
and when India became a part of this framework with the QI, it was naturally, a cause of 
some considerable inquiry in the immediate neighbourhood, particularly from China. The 
project was ill-conceived in that it ended up rankling the Chinese.
23 However, while the 
rankling needs to be taken care of, the intent to rattle the Chinese is a natural expectation 
that will continue to exist as long as China, on the one side, and the countries comprising 
the QI continue to hold divergent views on crucial issues of respective national and 
international import.  
 
The Chinese are concerned for they have very real fears about the US and Japan – 
China’s two most important neighbours. However, India has clear objectives from its 
joint military exercises with members of the QI and it is important that as a rising power, 
it should convey these to China – its most important neighbour – without being either 
vague or diffident in its statements. China is also India’s most serious potential adversary 
and this is a fact that cannot be wished away. Naturally both countries must continue 
efforts to improve relations but such improvement can only be realized and sustained if 
both sides understand each other’s core security concerns. 
 
 
                                                       
23  China, in fact, issued demarches to the four countries just days before their first-ever official-level 
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nations,” The Hindu, 14 June 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/14/stories/2007061404451200.htm. 
See also Yan Wei, “A Broader Asia Without China?” Beijing Review, No. 38, 20 September 2007, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2007-09/25/content_77617.htm.    21
The Way Ahead 
 
Singh and Abe identified the right starting point for the expanded partnership, namely 
economics. While it is easy to think that globalization will increasingly drive economic 
relations between nations, India’s trade with China and Japan, still requires a great deal of 
intervention and encouragement by the respective governments to increase bilateral trade. 
In the case of Sino-Indian relations, politics currently places a limit on the expansion of 
economic relations, but there are no such constraints in the case of Indo-Japanese 
relations; if anything political input can only help boost the economics.  
 
An EPA/CEPA between the two countries, as the Report of the Joint Study Group states 
“rests on complementarity of the partner economies”
24 and is more feasible than a FTA 
between China and India at the present stage. Further, this economic partnership could 
serve as “a building block for an even larger regional economic integration.”
25 This must 
be pursued as a strategic goal. India might have brought Japan into the SAARC as a 
counterweight to China, but it is nevertheless, a powerful choice. Japan already occupies 
an important place in many South Asian economies and its potential contribution in 
enhancing India’s own role in South Asia cannot be underestimated.  
 
India should, however, not forget that even Abe, Indophile that he was, made his first 
official visits abroad to China and South Korea, the first Japanese Prime Minister to do 
so. This was a message not only to the US but also to the rest of the world. India should 
be informed that as much as Abe was and others after him might be interested in 
expanding ties with India, Japan’s primary interests lie in its immediate neighbourhood. 
India should guard against going overboard with hype and hopes on the relationship with 
Japan. Perhaps, India’s lack of adequate knowledge and expertise about the country 
should put the brakes on unrealistic expectations.
26  For starters, India, which has an 
enormous pool of English speakers, has far fewer Japanese speakers than China. Also, 
almost before the hype of Manmohan Singh’s 2006 visit had died down, The Japan 
Times editorialized that while Japan and India were “natural partners”, “[t]he relationship 
will not be friction free.”
27 This is a remarkably forthright statement for the Japanese to 
make and must guide Indian expectations as well. 
 
India can respond only by shedding its timidity and taking on a more proactive role in 
East Asia. Greater defense cooperation, intelligence-sharing and joint initiatives on 
maritime security, counterterrorism, disaster prevention and management, and energy 
                                                       
24  “Report of the India-Japan Joint Study Group, June 2006,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of 
Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/report0606.pdf. 
25  “Report of the India-Japan Joint Study Group, June 2006,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of 
Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/report0606.pdf. 
26  During his visit to Japan, however, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh showed that he was aware 
of the problem when he stated, “We have decided to work together for a quantum leap in educational 
and cultural ties and people-to-people contacts. Mere incremental increases are not what we seek.” 
“Remarks by Prime Minister at Joint Press Interaction with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan,” 15 
December 2006, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://meaindia.nic.in/. 
27 “Editorial: A natural partnership in Asia,” The Japan Times, 20 December 2006, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20061220a1.html.   22
security will all come but a long-term relationship cannot be sustained if India and Japan 
do not first understand each other, make sure that they are talking the same language and 
share the same vision. The two countries’ lack of adequate knowledge and expertise on 
each other will limit growth in the relationship in the short term and it will take a great 
deal of effort to prevent this from turning into a long-term disadvantage. In this respect, 
inter-governmental cooperation alone is insufficient. Greater dialogue and interaction 
between the citizens of the two nations are essential for generating the trust and comfort 
levels required for a truly global and strategic partnership, generating “stalwart 
solidarity,” as Abe put it.
28 
 
India and Japan will continue to grow in importance to each other and their economic 
relationship will also grow if anything faster than their political relationship but if India is 
to remain of “crucial importance” to Japan and vice-versa, both countries must not just 
leverage the advantages of their economic relationship and shared geopolitical interests 
but also take seriously the shared values that have been declared as forming such an 
important component of their ties. That is the way towards shared and permanent 
interests for both countries. 
                                                       
28 “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” 26 September 2006, Speeches and Statements by Prime 
Minister, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/index_e.html.   23









co./  estab. in 
Japan 
Areas of dealing  Exports from Japan  Imports to Japan 
R.D. Tata & Co., 
Ltd. 
Bombay   -/1891    
(b) cotton yarn, cotton crepe, silk piece goods, matting, 
wood products, matches 
(b)  raw cotton 
E. Pabhany  Bombay   -/-    
(a) knitwear, towels, *zakka 
(b)  camphor, matches 
(a) raw cotton, rubber 
(b)  
ivory, raw cotton, arabic gum 
A.M. Essabhoy/ 
E. Faizullabhoy 
Bombay   -/-  India, “colonial 
territories”  
(a) matches, knitwear, towels, *zakka 
(b) willow 
hampers, bags, matches, brushes, umbrellas, purses, 
matting, brassware, 
(d) matches, camphor, cotton cloth, 
*zakka 
(a) raw cotton, chemicals, 
fertilizer, sheep skins, *zakka 
(b)  tapioca, coffee, pepper 
seeds, rape seed, etc 
(d)  raw 
cotton, chemicals 
M. Musabhoy      -/1919  Nanyo, India, 
South China, 
“various sea” 
(a) knitwear, towels, *zakka 
(b)  soap, toys, fans, 
perfume, umbrellas, purses, glassware 
(c) matches, 
knitwear, glassware, buttons, *zakka 
(d)  *zakka 
(b)  shellac gum 
C.Abdoola      -/-    
(a) *zakka 
(b) wood sticks, wood furniture, lacquerware, 
soap, paper, lanterns, matches, toys 
arabic gum 
M.N. Metha  Calcutta   1879/ 1915-16  India, "various 
areas" 
(c)glassware, matches, celluloid-ware, *zakka 
(d) 
chemicals, glass bangles, celluloid bangles, matches, 
materials for matches 
  
F.N. Abudolally      -/1919  India, China, 
Africa, Europe 
(c)  cotton yarn, cotton cloth, silk yarn, silk goods, 




Bombay   1883/1900  India (Bombay) 
(b) cotton yarn, cotton cloth, silk yarn, silk goods, 
dyeing materials, fertilizer, leather, cereals, 
(c) 
matches, *zakka 
(d)  *zakka, cotton yarn, materials for 
matches 
(b)  glue, shellac gum, olive 
oil, scrap hide, raw cotton etc 
(c) 
(d)  raw cotton 




cotton cloth, cotton yarn, matches, hardware, enamel-
ware, ceramics, glassware, *zakka 
(d)  *zakka, cotton 
goods 
(a)  raw cotton 
Peer Muhammad  Bombay   -/1922  India, Africa, 
London 
(c) cotton goods, knitwear, glassware, *zakka    
 
Adapted from Takashi Oishi (2004) International Journal of Asian Studies, 1,1  
Abbreviation: * zakka” in Japanese means miscellaneous goods. Sources: 
(a) data in 1910, Nikka Shinposha 1910. 
(b) data in 1911, Kobe Chamber of Commerce 1911 
(c) data in 1923, Kobe Shiyakusho 
1925 
(d)  data in 1926, Kobe Shiyakusho 1927. Some other cited in the references. Personal interviews.   24




Country  GDP  Rank  County  PPP GDP 
1  United States   13,201,819  1  United States   13,201,819 
2  Japan   4,340,133  2  China   10,048,026 b 
3  Germany   2,906,681  3  India     4,247,361 c 
4  China   2,668,071  4  Japan   4,131,195 
5  United Kingdom   2,345,015  5  Germany   2,616,044 
6  France     2,230,721a  6  United Kingdom   2,111,581 
7  Italy   1,844,749  7  France   2,039,171 
8  Canada   1,251,463  8  Italy   1,795,437 
9  Spain   1,223,988  9  Brazil   1,708,434 
10  Brazil   1,067,962  10  Russian Federation   1,704,756 
11  Russian Federation   986,940  11  Spain   1,243,440 
12  India    906,268 12 Mexico    1,152,356 
13  Korea, Rep.   888,024  13  Korea, Rep.   1,140,445 
14  Mexico    839,182 14 Canada    921,241 
15  Australia    768,178 15 Indonesia    728,340 
16  Netherlands    657,590 16 Australia    661,736 
17  Turkey    402,710 17 Turkey    617,910 
18  Belgium    392,001 18 Argentina    603,937 
19  Sweden    384,927 19 Thailand    592,958 
20  Switzerland    379,758 20 Netherlands    592,958 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 July 2007; Note available. PPP is purchasing power parity; an international 
dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as a U.S. dollar has in the United States.; a. Data include the French overseas departments of 
French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion. b. Excludes Kosovo.; b. Estimate is based on a 1986 bilateral comparison of China and 
the United States (Rouen and Kai 1995) employing a different methodology than that used for other countries. This interim methodology will be 
revised in the next few years; c. Estimate is based on regression; other PPP figures are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison 
Program benchmark estimates. 
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Appendix III: Share Of Top Investing Countries FDI Equity Inflows (Financial year-wise) 
 
Amount:  Rupees in crore (US$ in million) 
 












%age with total 
Inflows (in 
rupees) 
1   Mauritius     5,141  
(1,129)   
 11,441 
(2,570)   
 28,759 
 (6,363)   
 11,866  
(2,897)   
 77,756 
 (17,436)   
44.72 
2   U.S.A.     3,055  
(669)   
 2,210  
(502)   
 3,861  
(856)   
 1,630  
(396)   
 17,210  
(3,840)   
9.90 
3   U.K.     458  
(101)   
 1,164  
(266)   
 8,389  
(1,878)   
 624  
(122)   
 14,999 
 (3,340)   
8.63 
4   Netherlands    1,217  
(267)   
 340  
(76)   
 2,905  
(644)   
 689  
(167)   
 9,831  
(2,177)   
5.65 
5   Japan     575  
(126)   
 925  
(208)   
 382  
(85)   
 2,050  
(491)   
 8,050 
(1,802)   
4.63 
6   Singapore     822  
(184)   
 1,218  
(275)   
 2,662  
(578)   
 1,687  
(413)   
 7,492  
(1,697)   
4.31 
7   Germany     663  
(145)   
 1,345  
(303)   
 540  
(120)   
 1,083  
(265)   
 5,747 
 (1,295)   
3.30 
8   France     537  
(117)   
 82  
(18)   
 528  
(117)   
 178  
(43)   
 2,979  
(659)   
1.71 
9   Switzerland     353  
(77)   
 426  
(96)   
 257  
(56)   
 807  
(197)   
 2,738  
(620)   
1.57 
10   UAE     178  
(39)   
 219  
(49)   
 1,174  
(260)   
 369  
(89)   
 2,203 





(3,754)   
 24,613 
 (5,546)   
 70,630 
(15,726)   
 26,470  
(6,445)   
 197,907  
(44,373)   
- 
 
(i) *Includes inflows under NRI Schemes of RBI, stock swapped and advances pending for issue of shares. 
(ii) Cumulative country-wise FDI inflows (from April 2000 to August 2007) – Annex-‘A’.   26






    Country 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Australia  15  17  18  19  19  17         -     19     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -    
Bangladesh  17 13 14 15 15 13 10 11 12  9 13 12 10 11 11 11 15 16 
Belgium-Luxembourg  8 6 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 
Canada  16  19     -        -        -     20     -        -        -     17  15  17  16     -        -        -        -     18 
China, P.R.: Mainland  19     -        -        -     17     -        -     15  14  16  17  15  7  7  5  3  3  3 
China, P.R.: Hong 
Kong 
5 7 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 6 6 
Egypt        -       -        -     12  13     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -    
France  7 10 10  9 11 11 13 13 13 10  9  9 11 12 12 12 12 15 
Germany  3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 6 7 7 7 
Indonesia        -       -        -        -        -     19  14  14  19     -        -        -        -     18  16  16  19  19 
Iran, I.R. of        -       -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -     19  18  20     -    
Israel        -       -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -     19     -        -        -        -     20     -        -    
Italy  6 8 9 7 9 8 9 9 8 8 8 8 9 9  10 9 9  10 
Japan  2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 6 6 6 5 6 9  10  10 8 
Korea  11  18  15     -        -     18  17  17  18     -     20     -     13     -        -        -     16  11 
Kuwait  14     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -    
Malaysia  20     -     19     -     20     -     20  19  16     -        -     19  17  17  18  19     -        -    
Nepal  13     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -     20     -        -        -        -        -    
Netherlands  12 12 12 14 14 12 12 10 11 11 11 11 14 13 13 13 11 13 
Russia        -       -        -     11  10  10  8  12  9  12  10  10     -     19     -        -        -        -    
Saudi  Arabia  9 14 13 13 12 14 16 16 15 13 12 14 15 14 15 15 14 14 
Singapore  10 11 11  8  7  9 11  8 10 14 14 13 12 10  7  6  4  5 
South Africa        -       -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -     20     -        -        -        -        -        -     18  20 
Spain        -       -     17  17     -        -     19     -     20  15  16  16  18  16  17  17  17  17 
Sri Lanka        -       -        -        -     18  16  18  18  17  18  18  18     -     15  14  14  13  12 
Switzerland  18  15  16     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -    
Thailand        -    16     -     18  16  15  15  20     -        -        -     20  19  20  20     -        -        -    
U.S.S.R.        -    1  3  16     -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -    
United  Arab  Emirates              -      9 6  10 8 6 6 6 6 5 3 3 6 2 2 2 2 2 
United  Kingdom  4 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 4 4 2 4 4 5 5 4 
United  States  1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   27






   Country 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
        Australia  13  9 10  8  9  9 10 10 10 11 16 13 11 12  9  8  6  5 
        Bahrain      20  14  12  14  14  20           
        Belgium-Luxembourg  3 2 3 3 2 8 8 7 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 5  6 
        Brazil  18  20  20     16              
        Canada  17  19  17  17            20  19     
        C h i l e                     2 0  
        China,P.R.:  Mainland          20 13 13 19 14 16 15  8  8  4  3  1  1  1 
        China,P.R.:Hong  Kong             20  16  12  16  15  15  15  14 
        E g y p t       1 3   1 6                
        France  12 10  9 11 11 17 18 18 17 19    19 16 14 16 16 17  13 
        Germany  5 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 6  10 6 6 6 6 6 4  3 
        Indonesia           18  18  18  15  15  13  11  12  12  12 
        I s r a e l                 1 9     2 0     
    Iran, I.R. of  19  14  8  15  19  18  20  17  19    17               
        I r a q     1 7                   
        Italy  10 12 12 16 13 14 11 11 16 17 19 18 17 17 17 17 18  16 
        Japan  4 4 4 5 6 3 3 5 8 5 6 5 7 8 8  10  10 11 
        Korea  16 18 15 18 18 11 17 16 15 13 14 14 10  9  7  9  8  8 
        Kuwait  9  15  19 7 7 6 4 4 6 9  12  20  20           
        Malaysia  15 13 13 14    20 16 13 13 10  9  9  9 11 13 13 14  7 
        M o r o c c o      1 4                  
        Netherlands  14  16  18  19  17               
        Nigeria        12  8 19 19  9 11 14  7 17  5           
        Russia         12  20    20     18  18  18  18  16  15 
        Saudi  Arabia  7 6 6 4 3 4 5 3 3 7 3  11  13    20  19  19 18 
        Singapore  11 11 16 10 12 10  9 12 12 12 13  7  2 10 12 11 11  4 
        South  Africa            15  11  10    7  10  14  13   
        Switzerland  20        15  15  15  15 7 2 5 4    5 5 3 3 19 
        T h a i l a n d                    2 0   1 7  
        U . S . S . R .   6   7   1 1                  
        United  Arab  Emirates  8 8 7 9  10 7 7 8 9 8 8  12  14  15  14 5 7  9 
        United  Kingdom  2 5 5 6 5 5 6 6 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 7 9 10 
        United  States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2  2 
        Y e m e n ,   R e p u b l i c   o f                1 9          28
 
 
Appendix VI: India’s External Trade 
 
India's Export to  India's import from 
 
Percentage share to total 
 
Percentage share to total 
 
 




























1989  15,839.00 13.49  0.90  5.22  0.00  19,297.50 7.74  0.20  0.68  0.02 
1990  17,813.00 9.30 0.10  3.06  0.00  23,991.40  7.51  0.13  0.66  - 
1991  17,873.50 9.25 0.27  3.44  0.00  19,509.40  6.99  0.11  0.55  - 
1992  19,232.60 7.92 0.49  3.75  0.00  23,196.60  6.48  0.40  0.73  - 
1993  20,989.80 7.89 1.36  5.46  0.00  21,268.80  6.47  1.22  0.89  0.00 
1994  24,196.20 7.95 0.89  5.58  0.01  25,485.80  7.22  2.44  0.69  0.00 
1995  30,538.00 6.98 0.93  5.96  0.00  34,486.50  6.48  2.35  0.70  0.00 
1996  32,325.60 6.43 1.68  5.46  0.01  36,054.80  5.92  1.95  0.91  0.00 
1997  34,622.10 5.56 2.00  5.53  0.01  40,896.40  5.27  2.52  0.78  0.00 
1998  33,665.20 5.09 1.48  5.62  0.00  42,162.10  5.66  2.61  0.99  0.00 
1999  35,921.60 4.67 1.42  6.55  0.00  47,900.50  5.26  2.59  1.52  0.00 
2000  42,625.80 4.15 1.78  6.12  0.00  50,336.10  4.00  2.88  1.68  0.00 
2001  45,626.40 4.41 3.39  4.58  0.01  59,150.60  3.61  3.54  2.24  0.00 
2002  50,496.30 3.52 3.41  5.05  0.01  58,912.40  3.25  4.42  1.55  0.02 
2003  61,118.50 2.86 4.43  5.07  0.01  74,070.00  3.32  5.05  1.84  0.01 
2004  75,385.20 2.53 5.54  4.71  0.00  99,835.30  2.93  6.08  1.66  0.00 
2005  97,918.10 2.43 6.58  4.36  0.00 134,690.00  2.58  7.30  1.53  0.00 
2006  122,763.00 3.05 7.75  3.51  0.00 185,030.00  2.67  8.67  1.76  0.00 
 
Source: DOT   29
 
 







1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
        Australia  8  8 12 12 10 10 12 13 13 11 12 12 12 12 11 11 10 11 
        Belgium-Luxembourg  14 15 15 15 17 18 17 17 17 16 17 18 18 16 16 16 16 18 
        Canada  10  9 10 11 12 13 16 16 15 13 13 15 13 13 13 15 14 12 
        China,P.R.:  Mainland  7  11 8 7 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
        China,P.R.:Hong  Kong 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
        France  11 12 13 13 14 16 15 15 16 14 14 14 15 15 15 14 15 16 
        Germany  3 2 2 3 4 6 6 7 6 4 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 
        Indonesia  15 14 14 14 13 12 10 11 10 17 18 13 14 14 14 13 12 17 
        Italy  17 16 18 18 20 19 18 19 19 18 16 16 16 18 17 17 19 20 
        Korea  2 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
        Malaysia  13  13 9 9 9 9 8 8 8  10  10 8  10 9  10  10 9  10 
        Mexico        10 19 17 19 18 18 19 19 19 19 19    19 18 13 
        Netherlands  12 10 11 19 11 11 11 10 11  8  8 10  9 10  9  9 11  9 
        Panama  20 19 16 17 16 15 13 14 14 15 15 17 17 17 18 18 17 15 
        Philippines        20 15 14 14 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 12 12 13 14 
        Saudi  Arabia  18 17 17 16 18 20 20 20 20 20 20    20 20 19       
        Singapore  6 6 5 5 6 4 4 5 5 6 6 5 6 5 7 7 7 7 
        Spain     20           20     20  20  20   
        Switzerland  19  18  19                 
        R u s s i a                     1 9  
        Thailand  9 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 7 9 9 9 8 7 6 5 5 5 
        U . S . S . R .   1 6   2 0                   
        United  Kingdom  5 5 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 
        United  States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   30







1989 1990  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Australia  3 3  3  3 4 3 4 5  5 3 4 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 
Brazil  17  19  18  17  16  17  18  18  18  18   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -   
Canada  7  9  9  9  9  8  7 11  10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 13 13 
C h i l e    -      -     -     -    -    -   2 0    -   -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -   1 9  
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 
4 4  2  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
China,P.R.:Hong 
Kong 
2 0   2 0     -    -    -          -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -  
France  10 10  11  12 12 13 14 15  15 13 12 15 13 12 13 12 14 15 
Germany  6 6  6  6 6 6 6 6  6 6 6 9 8 6 8 8 8 8 
Indonesia  5 2  4  4 3 5 5 4  4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 7 7 
Iran, I.R. of   -    5  19  18  19  19   -    20  20   -    20  17  18  18  12  13  12  12 
Italy  14 17  14  14 14 14 15 14  13 14 16 18 16 14 16 16 17 18 
Korea  2  13  5  5 5 4 3 3  3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 
Kuwait  19        10     -     -    19   -     -    19  19  19  19  19  16  14 
Malaysia  11  11  10  10    10 8 7  9 7 7 7 7 9 9  10  10  10 
Philippines    -       -      20  20 20 20 19 16  16 16 15 12 12 13 14 14 15 16 
Qatar   -     -    16  -     -          -    20  18  16  14  16  15  15  11  11 
Russia   -        19  18  16  16  17  17  19  17  20  20   -    20  20  20   -   
Saudi  Arabia  8 7 -      7 8 9  11 9  8  11  10 8 9 7 6 6 3 3 
Singapore  18 16  8  16 15 15 13 12  14 15 14 14 17 17 18 18 19 17 
S o u t h  A f r i c a    -      -     -     -    -    -    -    -   -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -   2 0  
Switzerland  13  15  15  15  17  18  17  19  -    17  19   -     -    20   -     -     -     -   
Thailand  15 14  12  11 11 11 10 10  11  9  9 10 10 10 10  9  9  9 
U . S . S . R .   1 6   1 8   1 7   -    -    -    -    -   -    -      -    -    -            
United Arab 
Emirates 
9 8  7  8 7 7 9 8  7 8 8 5 6 8 7 7 4 4 
United  Kingdom 12 12  13  13 13 12 12 13  12 12 13 13 15 15 17 17 18    -    
United  States  1 1  1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
India  23 23  21  23 21 21 21 22  25 26 27 28 28  -       0.82 28 27 26 
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Appendix IX: Japan's External Trade 
 
Japan's Export to  Japan's import from 
 
































1989  274,693.00  0.73  3.09 4.18 0.02  209,641.00  0.94  5.29 1.05 0.05 
1990  287,839.00  0.59  2.13 4.55 0.02  235,334.00  0.88  5.12 0.93 0.04 
1991  315,018.00  0.48  2.73 5.19 0.03  236,658.00  0.92  6.02 0.87 0.02 
1992  339,997.00  0.44  3.52 6.11 0.03  232,908.00  0.87  7.29 0.88 0.02 
1993  362,831.00  0.42  4.78 6.29 0.03  241,713.00  0.95  8.54 0.83 0.02 
1994  395,317.00  0.52  4.73 6.51 0.03  274,323.00  0.97  10.05  0.78 0.01 
1995  443,292.00  0.57  4.95 6.27 0.02  336,141.00  0.87  10.69  0.81 0.01 
1996  411,614.00  0.59  5.30 6.16 0.02  349,664.00  0.82  11.56  0.74 0.01 
1997  421,466.00  0.52  5.15 6.47 0.02  338,709.00  0.78  12.35  0.66 0.01 
1998  388,040.00  0.62  5.20 5.79 0.02  280,867.00  0.78  13.20  0.62 0.01 
1999  419,456.00  0.58  5.59 5.28 0.02  310,774.00  0.72  13.86  0.58 0.01 
2000  478,361.00  0.52  6.35 5.68 0.02  379,577.00  0.69  14.53  0.44 0.01 
2001  403,517.00  0.48  7.67 5.76 0.02  349,081.00  0.63  16.55  0.42 0.01 
2002  416,789.00  0.45  9.59 6.10 0.02  337,172.00  0.62  18.33  0.42 0.01 
2003  471,906.00  0.51  12.18  6.34  0.02 382,953.00  0.57 19.73  0.35  0.01 
2004  565,811.00  0.54  13.06  6.26  0.02 454,809.00  0.57 20.74  0.36  0.01 
2005  594,887.00  0.59  13.45  6.05  0.02 515,194.00  0.62 21.05  0.30  0.01 
2006  646,779.00  0.69  14.35  5.63  0.02 578,694.00  0.71 20.47  0.27  0.00 
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Appendix X: Japanese FDI outflows by global region and main host country 1980–2001 (in Yen billion at current prices) 
 
1980-85 1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000 2001 1980-2001 
  Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value %
USA 4205  35 14740 46 9947 42 10177 34 797 20 39865.8 39
N. America  4408  36 15294 48 10323 44 10738 36 808.1 20 41571.3 41
 Hong Kong  470  3.9 957 3 597 2.5 540.7 1.8 37 0.9 2601.7 2.6
 Singapore  345  2.8 595 1.9 469 2 641.7 2.1 122.3 3.1 2173 2.1
 Taiwan  103  0.8 278 0.9 200 0.9 230.8 0.8 39.9 1 851.7 0.8
 Korea  137  1.1 347 1.1 179 0.8 338.9 1.1 68 1.7 1069.9 1.1
NIEs 1055  8.7 2177 6.8 1445 6.1 1752.1 5.8 267.2 6.8 6696.3 6.6
 Indonesia  1032  8.5 439 1.4 808 3.4 865.9 2.9 57.6 1.5 3202.5 3.2
 Malaysia  146  1.2 295 0.9 433 1.8 311 1 32 0.8 1217 1.2
Philippines 82  0.7 95 0.3 210 0.9 294.9 1 94.6 2.4 776.5 0.8
 Thailand  93  0.8 506 1.6 459 2 756.4 2.5 110.2 2.8 1924.6 1.9
NICs 1353  11 1335 4.2 1910 8.1 2228.2 7.4 294.4 7.4 7120.6 7
 China  64  0.5 360 1.1 1112 4.7 857 2.9 180.2 4.6 2573.2 2.5
 India  11  0.1 13 0 45 0.2 152.6 0.5 18.1 0.5 239.7 0.2
Asia 2511  21 3918 12 4610 20 5093 17 773 20 16905 17
MNE 205  1.7 62 0.2 172 0.7 118.4 0.4 2.5 0.1 559.9 0.6
 France  122  1 465 1.5 435 1.9 498.3 1.7 38.6 1 1558.9 1.5
 Germany  225  1.9 469 1.5 469 2 332.5 1.1 52.3 1.3 1547.8 1.5
 UK  310  2.6 2711 8.5 1733 7.4 5566.7 19 495.5 13 10816.2 11
Netherlands n.a.  n.a. 1010 3.2 956.6 4.1 2259.5 7.5 563.9 14 4790.3 4.7
Europe 1672  14 6739 21 4601 20 9574.3 32 1323 33 23909.1 24
Latin America  2369  20 3514 11 2120 9 3513.2 12 958.3 24 12474.5 12
Africa 484  4 342 1.1 269 1.1 210.2 0.7 24.1 0.6 1329.3 1.3
Oceania 505  4.2 1933 6.1 1411 6 810.7 2.7 66 1.7 4725.7 4.7
Total Yen billions  12154  100 31802 100 23506 100 30057 100 3955 100 101474 100
 
Adapted from John F. Cassidya and Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2006, Spatial determinants of Japanese FDI in China, Japan and the 
World Economy, Volume 18, Issue 4, December 2006, Pages 512-527. 
Source: Ministry of Finance Monthly Statistics December 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989; Ministry of Finance Home Page 
[http://www.mof.go.jp/].   33
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